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iV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Steven Moses Jay appeals from the judgment 0f conviction entered upon the

trial

verdicts

ﬁnding him guilty of felony domestic battery and misdemeanor obstructing 0f an ofﬁcer.

Statement
In

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The

December 2018, ofﬁcers responded

t0 a report

of a domestic Violence incident in Twin

—

p.17, L.9.)

They made contact with Keara Wilder,

p.16, L.16

Falls County.

(Trial Tn, Vol.

Who had gone

t0 a friend’s house.

p.17, Ls.10-15.)

I,

Proceedings

p.326, L.19

(Trial Tr., V01.

I,

p.325,

L22 — p.326,

L.13; Trial Tn, V01.

The ofﬁcers observed that Wilder’s nose and cheek were swollen.

— p.327,

an altercation with

down, struck her

II,

L.4; Trial Tn, Vol.

Jay, her boyfriend.

II,

II,

p.17,

L23 — p.18,

and then pushed her down again.

in the face twice,

(Trial Tr., V01.

p.17, Ls.16-20.) Wilder told the ofﬁcers that she

(Trial Tr., V01.

V01.

I,

p.327, L.18

— p.328, L9;

Trial T11, V01.

II,

(Trial Tn, p.18, Ls.14-17.)

be intoxicated.

Jay,

Who

(Trial Tr., V01.

initially resisted

— p.286, L25;

p.337, L.3

I,

p.281, L.18

by trying to

retreat

— p.338, L.12;

— p.284,

back

Jay,

Who

appeared

L.3; State’s Exhibit 19.) Ofﬁcers arrested

into the residence. (Trial Tr., V01.

I,

p.284, L.24

State’s Exhibit 19.)

Wilder went t0 the hospital emergency room for treatment of her

I,

(Trial

p.19, Ls.1-13.)

Ofﬁcers went t0 Jay’s and Wilder’s residence Where they encountered
to

had

L.14.) Jay pushed her

Wilder was coherent, did not slur her speech, and did not appear to be severely intoxicated.
Tr.,

II,

injuries.

(Trial Tr., Vol.

p.306, Ls.7-12.) Wilder reported, separately to a treating nurse and doctor, that she

was seeking

treatment because her boyfriend hit her multiple times with his ﬁst. (Trial

—

p.309, L.7; Trial

V01.

T11,

II,

p.7, Ls.5-13.)

The nurse observed

and an abrasion 0n the bridge ofher nose; bruising on her
side of her eyebrow;

also noted that Wilder

under the inﬂuence 0f any substances.
the injuries observed

lower jaw, and,

by

after a

was

alert

(Trial TL, V01.

CAT

and oriented, and did not appear

p.3 10, L.17

— p.3 12,

make up

an ofﬁcer

(Trial Tn, Vol.

be coherent and oriented.

at the hospital,

(Trial Tr., V01.

on the ﬂoor
p.24, L.6.)

II,

p.20, L.8

in the house,

The

state

t0

—

be

L. 14.) In addition to

0n Wilder’s

II,

the bridge 0f the nose” “had been

p.7, Ls.25

(Trial T11, V01.

II,

—

p.9,

p.10, L.1

Wilder again provided another similar account 0f the incident
to

p.309, L.8

scan was completed, diagnosed her with a fracture of the nasal bone,

broken into several different pieces.”
t0

I,

the nurse, the treating doctor additionally noted swelling

speciﬁcally observing that the “two thin bones that

found Wilder

I,

p.308, L.18

cheek, and above the right

(Trial Tn, Vol.

wrist.

I,

Wilder had a swollen nose

left wrist, left

and multiple scratches on her neck and

The nurse

p.310, L.16.)

that

Tr. Vol.

and then again

— p.21,

to the

same ofﬁcer 12 hours

L25.) The doctor also

— p. 1 1,
(that

L.18.)

Jay had battered her),

later at

Wilder’s residence.

L.7; p.23, Ls.2-24.) There, the ofﬁcer noted

which Wilder identiﬁed

as her blood.

two spots ofblood

(Trial Tn, V01.

II,

p.23, L.25

—

charged Jay with felony domestic battery and misdemeanor obstructing 0f an

ofﬁcer. (R., pp.40-42.)

By

the time of the

trial,

Wilder changed her story about What had occurred.

On

direct

examination, Wilder largely asserted that she could not remember what occurred that night because
she

was

intoxicated. (Trial Tn, V01.

p.208, L.23

— p.209,

L.1; p.214, L. 11

I,

p.192, Ls.20-22; p.195, Ls.1-14; p.196, L.18

— p.217,

L.5.)

— p.197, L22;

However, through refreshing her recollection

from police bodycam Videos, the prosecutor

elicited

pushed her down onto the ground, struck her twice

testimony that Wilder told police that Jay

in the face,

bruising and scratching and a broken nose.1 (Trial Tn, Vol.

I,

and threw her on the couch, causing
p.208, L.23

— p.212, L21.) Wilder

provided the same account in a written statement t0 police, and permitted ofﬁcers to take multiple
photos of her injuries While she described Jay’s battery 0f her t0 them.
L. 11

— p.216,

L.4; p.222, L.18

phone

sorry and that

was a mistake.

it

p.235, L.6; State’s Exhibits 1-18.)

Tr.,

V01.

I,

p.2 14,

After refreshing her

Jay made to her from jail, Wilder testiﬁed that Jay told her that he was

recollection 0f a

call

—

(ﬂ Trial

(Trial Tr., V01.

I,

p.235, L.14

— p.237,

L.1.)

On cross-examination, Wilder asserted that she was able t0 remember signiﬁcant events of
the night of the incident.

t0 get into her car

when

She testiﬁed deﬁnitively
she

residence (Where the blood

L.4.)

was leaving

that Jay did not batter her, that she fell trying

the residence, that she then returned t0 the inside 0f the

was found), and then

left again.

(Trial TL, V01.

I,

p.241, L. 14

Wilder testiﬁed that she had told ofﬁcers a different account because she was intoxicated

and not clear—headed

at the time,

and

that she

had changed her position about what happened

she stopped taking painkillers several weeks after the incident. (Trial Tn, V01.
p.247,

1

— p.247,

L16 — p.248,

The jury was

I,

after

p.246, Ls.14-18;

L.4; p.251, Ls.3—12.)

instructed that the Wilder’s prior statements t0 ofﬁcers could only be used for the

purpose 0f evaluating Wilder’s

credibility. (R., p.

1

19.)

However, the

district court

concluded that

Jay’s statements t0 the nurse were admissible as substantive evidence pursuant t0 the I.R.E. 803(4)

hearsay exception for statements

L.10 —

made

for medical diagnosis or treatment. (Trial Tr., V01.

I,

p.303,

Jay subsequently did not object to the doctor’s testimony about Wilder’s
statements made to him, and thus this testimony too could be utilized by the jury as substantive
evidence. (Trial Tr., V01. II, p.5, L.2 — p.14, L23.)
p.304, L.11.)

The jury found Jay guilty ofboth
eight—year sentence with three years

jail

charges. (R., p. 1 3

ﬁxed

1 .)

The

district court

for felony domestic battery,

and a concurrent one-year

sentence for obstructing an ofﬁcer, but retained jurisdiction for one year.

9/3/19 Tn, p.26, L.11

— p.28,

imposed a uniﬁed

L.24.) Jay timely appealed. (R., pp.170-175.)

(R.,

pp.160-166;

ISSUES
Jay states the issues 0n appeal

Did the

I.

as:

district court err

by denying Mr.

Jay’s motion for a mistrial after the

prosecutor brought up prohibited I.R.E. 404(b) evidence of prior bad acts?

Did

II.

the State

commit prosecutor misconduct

in closing arguments

by

disparaging and misrepresenting the defense?

Did the

III.

State

commit prosecutor misconduct

in closing

essentially testifying the jury as [an] expert witness

Did the

IV.

district court

abuse

its

discretion

argument by

on domestic Violence?

When it imposed a uniﬁed sentence

of eight years, With three years ﬁxed, upon Mr. Jay following his conviction
for felony domestic battery?

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

The

1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Did the

district court

properly deny Jay’s motion for a mistrial after Jay opened the door to

the challenged testimony?

2.

Has Jay

failed to

show

argument by speculating

that the prosecutor
that the defense

committed misconduct during

was attempting

his rebuttal

t0 encourage the jury t0 enter a

split verdict?

3.

Has Jay

failed to demonstrate fundamental error With respect to his assertion that the

prosecutor committed misconduct during his rebuttal

argument by discussing the

prevalence of recanting domestic Violence Victims at the courthouse?

4.

Has Jay

failed t0

show

that the district court

abused

its

sentencing discretion?

ARGUMENT
I.

The

District Court Properly

Denied

Jay’s

Motion For A Mistrial After JaV Opened The Door T0

The Challenged Testimony
A.

Introduction

Jay contends that the
brief, pp.7-15.)

attempt to

district court erred

Speciﬁcally, Jay asserts that a mistrial

elicit

was warranted

for a mistrial. (Appellant’s

of the prosecutor’s

in light

testimony about prior physical altercations between Jay and Wilder.

However, a review ofthe record reveals

that Jay

0n cross—examination about Whether she was
question

by denying his motion

was improper,

(Id.)

opened the door t0 the testimony by asking Wilder

afraid 0f Jay. In

any event, even

the district court correctly concluded that

it

if the prosecutor’s

did not rise to the level of

reversible error that necessitated a mistrial.

B.

Standard

Of Review

The standard 0f review

for a denial of a

[T]he question 0n appeal

is

motion for

not whether the

discretion in light 0f circumstances existing

trial

When

mistrial is well established:

judge reasonably exercised his
the mistrial motion was made.

must be Whether the event which precipitated the motion for
when Viewed in the context 0f the full record.
Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the “abuse of
discretion” standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one 0f
reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident
that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial Will
be disturbed only if that incident, Viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible
Rather, the question

mistrial represented reversible error

error.

State V. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 68,

559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007)).

253 P.3d 727, 742 (2011) (quoting State

V.

Field,

144 Idaho

The

C.

“A

District

mistrial

Court Properly Denied Jay’s Mistrial Motion

may

be declared, upon the defendant’s motion,

legal defect during the trial

fair trial.”

29.1.)

Which

is

prejudicial t0 the defendant

State V. D0912, 129 Idaho 597, 603,

571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) (citing State

V.

has been an error 0r

and deprives the defendant of a

930 P.2d 1039, 1045

A fair trial, however, is “not necessarily a perfect trial.”

if there

ﬂ

(Ct.

App. 1996)

(citing I.C.R.

State V. Field, 144 Idaho 559,

Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28,

725 P.2d 128, 132-33

(1986)). Consequently, “[t]he admission of improper evidence does not automatically require the

declaration of a mistrial.”

State V.

Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 128, 136

(Ct.

App.

2008)
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
in order t0

show

that

is

not admissible to prove a person’s character

he acted in conformity therewith, but such evidence

may be

admitted

Hobbs

Livestock C0.

V.

Ada

V. Farr,

County, 93 Idaho 443, 445, 462 P.2d 742, 745 (1969) (quoting

142

F. 116,

117 (10th

Cir. 1905)), the

Idaho Supreme Court explained the

long-established concept 0f “opening the door” to otherwise inadmissible

The general

it is

m

relevant for other purposes. I.R.E. 404(b).

In

if

trial

evidence as follows:

govern the situation where a party has opened the door
complain When his adversary
takes advantage thereof was succinctly stated over sixty years ago in the federal
case of Warren Livestock C0. v. Farr, ‘one who induces a trial court t0 let down the
rule to

for admission of irrelevant evidence at trial only t0

bars to a ﬁeld of inquiry that

complain

m

if his

adversary

is

is

also United States V. Whitworth,

inadmissible evidence

not competent or relevant t0 the issues cannot

also allowed t0 avail himself of the opening.

may become

856 F.2d 1268, 1284-1285

(9th Cir.

admissible where opposing party has, by

1988) (otherwise

its

own

actions,

“opened the door”

to the testimony); State V.

App. 1994) (holding

that defendant

Drennon, 126 Idaho 346, 352, 883 P.2d 704, 710

“opened the door”

to otherwise inadmissible 404(b) evidence

of prior uncharged acts by putting one 0f the enumerated elements 0f I.R.E. 404(b)

During the jury

trial in this

(Ct.

at issue).

case, during Jay’s cross-examination of Wilder, the following

exchange occurred:

— Who’s

[Counsel]:

Keara, d0 you fear Mr. Jay, as he
a fear 0f him?

[Wilder]:

He’s n0 threat t0 me. Never has been.

(Trial Tr., Vol.

p.250, L.24

I,

— p.251,

seated beside

me? D0 you have

L.2.)

Then, during the prosecutor’s re-direct examination 0f Wilder, the following exchange
occurred:

[Prosecutorz

You testiﬁed the Defendant has never — your words — never been a threat to
you?

[Wilder]:

He’s never been a threat to me.

[Prosecutor]:

That’s not true,

[Wilder]:

No, I’m

[Prosecutor]:

You told the

[Wilder]:

At

[Prosecutor]:

You told the

[Wilder]:

Ithought

[Prosecutor]:

Yeah. So 0n the night in question, you were actually scared 0f him?

[Wilder]

Yes.

:

You’re scared of him?

is it?

not.

ofﬁcers you were scared 0f him.

the time, Ithought

I

ofﬁcers

I

was.

— So you remember,

at the time,

being scared of him?

was, yes.

[Prosecutor]

[Wilder]

:

Huh. So you remember the fear you —
Because

:

[Prosecutor]

:

I

don’t

remember —

No. You had experienced — you remember the fear you experienced

that

night?

[Wilder]

Very

:

[Prosecutor]

[Wilder]

Enough

:

You
I

:

[Prosecutor]

:

I,

0f the

man you

love?

:

you were scared 0f actually him hurting

intoxicated.

You claim he

It’s

:

[Prosecutor]

(Trial Tr., Vol.

that you’re scared

said

was

I

didn’t

know what I was

his kids.

saying at the time.

has never been a threat t0 you twice now, and yet that night

told the ofﬁcers that this wasn’t the ﬁrst time,

you
[Wilder]

but yes.

N0, I’m not scared 0f him.

:

[Prosecutor]

[Wilder]

:

little,

never happened.

You told the

p.265, L.1

It’s

was

it?

never happened.

ofﬁcers that this was, What? The third 0r fourth time?

— p.266,

L.11.)

Before Wilder could answer this ﬁnal question, Jay obj ected, and then, outside the presence

0f the

jury,

moved

for a mistrial

I.R.E. 404(b) evidence

p.266, L.12

— p.270,

at the present

—

p.269, L.4.)

Jay’ s

on the basis

that the prosecutor attempted to elicit inadmissible

0f Jay’s prior uncharged abuse perpetrated 0n Wilder.

L.7.) Jay argued that his questioning

(Trial Tn, V01.

OfWilder about Whether she feared Jay

time did not open the door t0 the prosecutor’s question. (Trial Tn, V01.

The prosecutor argued

I,

I,

p.268, L.5

that Jay’s questioning necessarily implicated the nature

0f

and Wilder’ s relationship, predictably elicited testimony from Wilder that Jay was not a threat

to her,

and

that this

opened the door for the

state t0 inquire

about Jay and Wilder’s relationship

history,

Ls.

1 1

and speciﬁcally, the abuse

that has occurred in that relationship.

(Trial Tn, Vol,

I,

p.270,

-24.)

Following a recess, during Which the court reviewed a recording 0f the relevant testimony

and a realtime transcription
in

Which

it

(Trial Tn, V01.

I,

p.272, Ls.16-18), the court

made the

following ruling,

both denied Jay’s motion for a mistrial, and ruled that Jay had opened the door t0 the

prosecutor’s question:

And the

question was, from [defense counsel] t0 this witness:

as he is seated besides

me? Do you have

Do you fear Mr.

Jay,

a fear 0f him?

The witness’s answer was: He’s n0

threat to

me. Never has been.

vacuum, would be 404(b)
door was clearly opened by the
Defendant’s question and the witness’s response. The response as — I understand

So the question

evidence. However,

as asked

it is

by

[the prosecutor], in a

this Court’s ruling that the

— What

of the question was, but the
response given by the witness was entirely predictable, based upon the question
that was asked. And the question as asked by [defense counsel] can be reasonably
be interpreted t0 mean: Have you ever had a fear of him, as he’s seated here today?
[defense counsel’s] assertion that the

And the answer was
And

his intent

given that she has never had a fear of him.

ﬁnd that it was an impermissible 404(b)
Criminal Rule 29.1, and is to be granted
Idaho
by
an error or legal defect in the proceeding, 0r if there is conduct that is
so based

on

that, I

don’t

question. Mistrial, as governed
if there is

prejudicial t0 the Defendant,

the previous questions

and deprives the Defendant 0f a

by Defendant’s counsel

fair trial.

t0 this witness,

I

Based upon

don’t

ﬁnd

the

conduct 0f [the prosecutor], in asking the question, is prejudicial. And furthermore,
I certainly don’t ﬁnd that it deprives the Defendant 0f a fair trial since n0 answer

was

given.

(Trial Tn, V01.

I,

p.272, L.18

— p.274,

L.2.)

However, then, despite ruling
question

was not improper,

the court

that Jay

still

had opened the door and

that the prosecutor’s

sustained Jay’s objection to the question, precluded

10

Wilder from answering

it,

and informed the jury that the question was struck and

speculate about the question’s answer.

(Trial T11, p.274, L.3

that

it

was not to

— p.275, L.12; p.276, L.18 — p.278,

L.2.)

The

district court’s initial

conclusion that Jay opened the door to the prosecutor’s question

about prior physical altercations between Jay and Wilder was correct. While defense counsel tried
t0

frame the question in such a

Jay,

and Wilder’s answer

their relationship.

way t0

that she

avoid that

result, the

question about Wilder’s lack 0f fear 0f

had “never” feared him, necessarily implicated the nature 0f

The prosecutor was not required

t0 leave the jury

With the false defense-

proffered impression that Wilder and Jay had a peaceful co-existence, particularly since

it

was

tasked with making credibility determinations in this case regarding Wilder’s and Jay’s denials 0f
the facts underlying Jay’s felony domestic battery.

prosecutor’s question

Even

if Jay

was

were

warranted because the

the court initially concluded, the

proper, and Wilder should have been permitted t0 answer

correct,

and merely asking the question

district court

and because the question

As

itself did

district court’s instructions.

no

mistrial

was

allowed n0 answer, instructed the jury to ignore the question,

not render Jay’s

State V.

interj ected error,

it.

trial unfair.

The jury is presumed to follow the

Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871, 332 P.3d 767, 783 (2014)

State V. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718,

264 P.3d

54, 59 (2011)).

entire defense necessitated a jury determination that Wilder’s

Further, unique t0 this case, Jay’s

numerous detailed statements

ofﬁcers and medical providers about what happened the night 0f the incident were

11

(citing

all

untue.

t0

It is

unlikely that this particular attempted elicited statementz

credibility determination in light

0f

all

would be

the one that ﬂipped the jury’s

of the other allegedly false statements made by Wilder.

any continuing impact from the prosecutor’s question was minimal

Finally,

overwhelming evidence 0f Jay’s

And Course Of The

guilt as discussed

Proceedings section of this

above in the

brief.

state’s

in light

Statement

Therefore, Jay has failed t0

0f the

Of The
show

Facts

that the

district court erred.

Because Jay

failed t0

show

the challenged question prevented

him from

getting a fair trial

of the evidence against him and the curative instruction, he has failed t0 show that the

in light

district court erred in

denying his motion for a

mistrial.

II.

Jay Has Failed T0

Show That The

Prosecutor Committed Misconduct During His Rebuttal

Argument BV Speculating That The Defense Was Attempting To Encourage The JurV To Enter

A Split Verdict
A.

Introduction

Jay contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his rebuttal argument by
allegedly “misstating and disparaging the defense’s theory.”

2

As Jay

is

correctly notes

0n appeal, a prosecutor’s question

also not evidence) can constitute reversible error

by

(Appellant’s brief, pp.16-18.)

to a Witness (such as

interjecting clearly

an argument that

improper suggestions

even When the question is not answered. (Appellant’s brief, p. 11 n. 1. (citing State V. Christiansen,
144 Idaho 463, 469, 163 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2007)). However, as the district court found, the
prosecutor had a good faith basis for pursuing this line 0f inquiry based on the defense opening

may have feared Jay. Moreover, in this case, the lack of an answer
reduced any potential prejudice, in light 0f both Wilder’s assertion that most 0f her
statements to police and medical providers about the incident were untrue, and the fact that the

the door to past times Wilder
at least

prosecutor was never able t0 attempt t0

elicit

any details about the prior incidents

t0.

12

that

were alluded

Speciﬁcally, Jay takes issue with the prosecutor’s argument that Jay
t0 entice the jury into entering a split verdict,

charge.

(Id.)

Standard

Where

strategically attempting

with an acquittal 0f the felony domestic Violence

However, a review 0f the context 0f the prosecutor’s statement reveals

proper, and that, even if improper,

B.

was

was

any error was harmless.

the defendant objects t0 alleged prosecutorial misconduct in the trial court, this

if there

was

prosecutorial misconduct” and then “determine[s]

whether the error was harmless.” Moses, 156 Idaho

at

868, 332 P.3d at 780.

The Prosecutor’s Argument Was Proper

C.

Prosecutorial misconduct occurs where the prosecutor “so infect[s] the

make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”

127 P.3d 212, 221

App. 2005).

(Ct.

set forth

trial

With unfairness

State V. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 3

The Idaho Supreme Court has

misconduct occurs when the State attempts

that

it

Of Review

Court ﬁrst “determine[s] factually

as t0

that

t0 secure a verdict

on any

(2019) (quoting State

V.

that evidence.”

factor other than the

State V. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 122,

Berna], 164 Idaho 190, 196, 427 P.3d

Idaho 386, 440, 348 P.3d

1,

55 (2015)).

attorney in closing argument. State

V.

It is

1,

8,

said that “[p]rosecutorial

by the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including reasonable

may be drawn from

1

law as

inferences

443 P.3d 129, 136

7 (2018); State

V.

Abdhullah, 158

misconduct for a prosecutor t0 disparage a defense

Baruth 107 Idaho 651, 656, 691 P.2d 1266, 1271

1984).

13

(Ct.

App.

With respect
States

t0 prosecutorial

Supreme Court has

misconduct in the context 0f closing argument, the United

stated:

Isolated passages of a prosecutor’s argument, billed in advance t0 the jury

do not reach the same proportions [as
consistent and repeated misrepresentation that may have a signiﬁcant impact 0n a
jury’s deliberations]. Such arguments, like all closing arguments 0f counsel, are
seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation frequently
results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than crystal clear. While these
general observations in n0 way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they d0 suggest
that a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark
to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy
exhortation, Will draw that meaning from the plethora 0f less damaging
as a matter of opinion not 0f evidence,

interpretations.

Donnellv V. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-647 (1974).

The Idaho Supreme Court has
arguments in

light

also reiterated the importance of reviewing closing

prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court]

m, 144

must keep

in

mind

the realities of trial.”

Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) (quoting State

428, 725 P.2d 128, 132-133 (1986)).
right t0

m

0f their improvisational nature, noting that “in reviewing allegations of

V.

Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-

The Idaho Court oprpeals has ﬁthher recognized

due process does not guarantee a defendant an error—free

trial

“[t]he

but a fair one,” and the

“not to discipline the prosecutor for misconduct, but t0 ensure that

function of appellate review

is

any such misconduct did not

interfere With the defendant’s right t0 a fair trial.” State V. Reynolds,

120 Idaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 1002, 1008

App. 1991).

(Ct.

In this case, during the state’s closing argument, after discussing the

obstructing of an ofﬁcer charge (Trial
“I don’t think there will

Tr.,

V01.

II,

be much argument on

p.103, L.24

this

14

— p. 104,

misdemeanor

L. 1 3), the prosecutor argued,

one for the defense.

I

wouldn’t be surprised

if

[defense counsel] actually stands up and concedes this crime.” (Trail Tn, Vol.

Then, in the

state’s rebuttal

II,

p. 104, Ls. 14-17).

argument, after no defense argument was presented with respect to that

charge, the prosecutor argued:

Itold you the defense wasn’t going to stand up and argue the resisting arrest.
Not one argument about it. Why? If you look at your preliminary instructions —
100k at this. I want to bring this up to you because it’s a strategic ploy by the
defense, and I want you t0 reject it.
Instructions

and

Number

1

and 2

state the charges

and which charges

I

brought,

says the defendant has pleaded not guilty to both. Interesting.

it

The defense wants you t0 go sit in that room and stew over the felony
domestic Violence and say, “You know what? This is ugly. I don’t know, dealing
With domestic Violence is scary and gross. Let’s split the baby and give the State
the resisting.” That’s Why.

(Trial Tn, V01.

At
strategy,”

II,

p.136, L.14

this point,

— p.137,

L.1.)

Jay objected 0n the ground that the prosecutor was “speculating as t0 legal

Which Jay argued was “improper argument.”

district court

overruled the objection. (Trial TL, V01.
That’s why.

Don’t.

(Trial Tr., Vol.

He
II,

Initially,

They want you

to split the

could have pleaded guilty to

it,

p.137, L.5.)

II,

p.137, Ls.2-4.)

The

The prosecutor continued:

baby King Solomon

style.

Don’t.

but he didn’t.

p.137, Ls.7-9.)

the state notes that the ground for objection provided

prosecutor was “speculating as t0 legal strategy,”
raises

II,

(Trial Tr., V01.

on appeal —

that the prosecutor

(Appellant’s brief, pp.16-18.)

is

by Jay

—

that the

not precisely the same as the challenge he

was “misstating and disparaging

the defense’s theory.”

An obj ection 0n one ground does not preserve

15

at trial

for appeal a separate

and different basis for objection not raised before the

trial court.

State V. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590,

597, 836 P.2d 536, 543 (1992). Therefore, this Court could hold that this assertion

Even

if preserved,

it

is this

difference between

is

commenting 0n defense

waived.

strategy,

and

disparaging defense counsel 0r the defense, which demonstrates that the prosecutor’s argument

was

proper.

The prosecutor did not disparage defense counsel 0r

prosecutor drew an inference to
proper.

“Where statements

make

his

own argument

the defense.

Instead, the

about Jay’s defense strategy. This was

are ‘directed at the tactics or techniques of trial counsel rather than

counsel's integrity or character[,]’ the argument

is

permissible.” State

V.

Reyes, 108 S.W.3d 161,

170 (Mo. App. 2003) (quoting State V. O’Haver, 33 S.W.3d 555, 563 (M0. App. 2000)). Ultimately,

and contrary

to Jay’s assertion

the jury t0 reach a verdict

opposite, t0 reach a verdict

on appeal (Appellant’s

brief, p.24), the

prosecutor was not asking

0n a basis outside of the evidence — he was asking the jury

t0

do the

0n both 0f the two charges based upon the evidence presented, and

to

avoid any inferred invitation from the defense to “split the baby” as some kind of compromise.

Even
state’s

if

improper, the error was harmless. Again, overwhelming evidence supported the

theory of the case. In addition t0 the facts as relayed above, the injuries suffered by Wilder

were simply not consistent with her story about how she obtained them
car,

but were entirely consistent with the contemporaneous account of the incident that she gave

t0 ofﬁcers

it

falling outside near her

and medical providers. Further,

if Wilder

did suffer her injuries due t0 slipping outside,

simply makes n0 sense that she would then create a false account of domestic Violence that she

would repeat multiple times

to

Wilder would

away only by

later explain

numerous individuals over the next

day, a false account

referencing alcohol and pain

16

pills.

Which

Finally, the

prosecutor’s speculation about the defense attempting t0 encourage a split verdict did not implicate

any of the

factual or credibility determinations the jury

was tasked with making, which were

the

determinations that this case turned on.

Jay has failed t0 demonstrate that the prosecutor’s argument about the defense strategy was
improper. This Court should therefore

rej ect his

assertion and

afﬁrm Jay’s convictions.

III.

JaV Has Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Error With Respect To His Assertion That The
Prosecutor Committed Misconduct During His Rebuttal Argument

Prevalence

A.

BV Discussing The

Of Recanting Domestic Violence Victims At The Courthouse

Introduction

For the ﬁrst time 0n appeal, Jay contends that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial
misconduct during his rebuttal argument by discussing the prevalence of recanting domestic
Violence Victims. (Appellant’s brief, pp.19-26.)
t0 demonstrate

B.

fundamental

Standard

A review 0f the record reveals that Jay has failed

error.

Of Review

“[T]he standard 0f review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct depends 0n

whether the defendant obj ected

215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009).

to the

misconduct

at trial.” State V.

If a defendant fails to timely object at trial to allegedly

arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction Will be

upon a showing by the defendant
error.

Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715,

that the alleged

State V. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226,

set aside for prosecutorial

misconduct

misconduct only

rises t0 the level

245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).
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improper closing

of fundamental

JaV Has Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Error

C.

above, prosecutorial misconduct occurs Where the prosecutor “so infect[s] the

As noted
trial

with unfairness as to

Idaho

at

make

of

claim

a

contemporaneous objection
150 Idaho

at

prosecutorial

443 P.3d

was

strategic, the

at 133.

made

counsel

is

Li.

show

that

“one 0r more

a

PC_rry,

unwaived

Second, “the error must be clear or obvious.” Li. “This
also contain evidence as

a tactical decision in failing to object.”

m,

165 Idaho

at

and thus more appropriately addressed Via a petition

factual in nature

for post—conviction relief.”

Li

0r her] substantial rights.”

my,

Finally, the appellant

must show

Li.

by

“Ifthe record does not contain evidence regarding Whether counsel’s decision

claim

the appellant

unpreserved

presented 0n appeal, the Court applies a three step review.

is

were violated.”

trial

119,

proceedings.”

misconduct,

must contain evidence 0f the error and the record must

the record

whether 0r not

trial,

including

error,

228, 245 P.3d at 980. First, the appellant must

constitutional rights

to

San_chez, 142

318, 127 P.3d at 221.

Where

means

the resulting conviction a denial 0f due process.”

150 Idaho

at

226, 245 P.3d

that the clear error

must be

clear

at

that the error affected [his

978. Where, as here, there

was a

“must have affected the outcome 0f the

The Idaho Supreme Court has

affected the trial proceedings

“must demonstrate

trial

recently clariﬁed that “[w]hether the error

from the appellate record.”

m,

165 Idaho

at 119-

120, 443 P.3d at 133-134.

Near the
about this

trial”

start

was

of Jay’s closing argument, defense counsel argued that “[w]hat’s unique

that there

were only two eyewitnesses

18

to the incident,

and

that

both — Jay and

Wilder — testiﬁed under oath that “these events the State has alleged did not occur.”

II,

p.105, L.20

— p.106,

Counsel then emphasized

L.7.)

(Trial Tr. Vol.

this point:

So let me say that one more time. The only two eyewitnesses to the alleged
crime both testiﬁed, both 0f them testiﬁed under oath that these events did not
occur.

So

just at the beginning of our analysis of this case, it’s already highly

unusual, because both the alleged Victim and the alleged perpetrator have both
testiﬁed under oath at the

trial that

these things did not occur.

They’re the only

n0 other eyewitness saying these events occurred. Both of
them testiﬁed at trial yesterday and today that it simply did not occur, that Mr. Jay
was not the source of the injuries. So that’s somewhat unusual. And the reason
eyewitnesses. There

Why

it’s

unusual

testiﬁed that

(Trial Tn, V01.

II,

it

is

is

because both of the eyewitnesses t0 the alleged crime both

didn’t happen.

p.105, Ls.8-21.)

Later in his argument, defense counsel emphasized the point yet again

We have to recall,

as

I

—

stated in the very beginning, that there are only

two

eyewitnesses, and both 0f those eyewitnesses have testiﬁed that these events did

not occur, Which
(Trial Tn, V01.

II,

is

highly unusual.

p.116, Ls.13-16.)

In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor responded to defense counsel’s repeated factual

assertion that both eyewitnesses denying the underlying charged criminal conduct

was “highly

unusual”:

[Defense counsel] says
That’s not unusual.

it’s

Come down

domestic Violence cases and see
stand and looks at the
after

and

stares

them

man who

in the eye

unusual that they both testiﬁed
t0 the courthouse

how

it

did not happen.

any time you want and watch

often a domestic Violence Victim takes the

she has to live with and will probably live with

and

says, “Yeah, that’s the

come down and count how many 0f these

man Who beat me.” You

Victims you see.
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N0, it is not unusual for a Victim to take that stand and deny everything that
happened and say that she just loves her spouse so much that she accidentally
tripped and hit her face 0n a countertop. Every Friday, down the hall.
(Trial Tn, V01.

II,

p.133, Ls.12-23.)

Jay did not obj ect t0

this

committed misconduct. Jay has
It

was proper

argument.

Now, on

appeal, he argues that the prosecutor

failed t0 establish fundamental error.

for the prosecutor t0 respond t0 Jay’s

for a battery defendant

and Victim

t0

argument

it

was “highly unusual”

both deny that the battery occurred. Because there was no

evidence on the general prevalence 0f Victim recanting presented

Jay,

that

could only properly appeal to the jury’s

own

personal

life

at the trial, the prosecutor, like

experiences and understanding of

domestic Violence. In countering Jay’s argument, the prosecutor evoked a particular context where
domestic Violence Victims

it

was highly unusual

occur,

it

may recant — a courthouse. Because the defense speciﬁcally argued that

for both eyewitnesses t0 testify that the events charged

by

the state did not

was proper rebuttal argument to point out that is not true, particularly in domestic Violence

cases Where there

Certainly,

is

often a motive for the Victim to recant.

own

a prosecutor’s introduction of information based upon his

knowledge 0r observations

creates the potential for improper argument.

However,

personal

like the defense

argument, the prosecutor’s reference to Victims recanting in the courthouse was too vague, and too
lacking in a precise evidentiary basis, to cross the line into improper argument.

The prosecutor

did not refer t0 scientiﬁc evidence about recanting that existed outside of the record, or attempt t0

present his

own

speciﬁc evidence or examples of recanting Victims.

He

simply disputed defense

counsel’s assertion, and very broadly asserted that, to the contrary, Victim recanting

20

is

not, in fact,

unusual — “[c]ome

down to

the courthouse. .and see.” This did not provide signiﬁcantly different
.

information that Jay’s argument did.

would not have been

It

surprising to a juror

where

either

defense counsel or the prosecutor generated their competing positions 0n the prevalence of
recanting Victims

—

in their

employment, and

discussed above,

at the courthouse. Additionally, as

the state prevented substantial evidence that a Victim recanted in this very case.

these

same reasons, even

t0 the extent that the prosecutor’s reliance

was improper, Jay has

context

argument did not

failed to satisfy the ﬁrst Pe_rry

still

rise t0 the level

0n the courtroom imagery

prong because the manner 0f

0f a constitutional Violation.

Jay also cannot satisfy the second PC_rry prong.
tactical.

In any event, for

Jay’s decision not t0 object

was

likely

Shortly after this portion of the prosecutor’s argument, Jay raised an objection to another

portion of the argument

p.137, Ls.2-4.)

— demonstrating

made

the prosecutor

by

in response t0 Jay’s contrary argument.

Finally,

own arguments

in a

bad

ability t0

at

do

so.

(Trial T11, V01.

II,

most, a striking of the reference to

— not of the argument

indistinguishable from the one defense counsel recently

counsel and his

and

An objection would have merely resulted in,

the courtroom context presented

above, was

his willingness

itself,

which, as noted

Moreover, asserting that an argument

made was improper could put defense

light.

Jay cannot satisfy the third Pe_rry prong because he cannot demonstrate prejudice.

Regardless of how unusual Victim recanting

overwhelming evidence

is

in general, in this particular case, the state presented

that such recanting occurred.

In addition to the evidence of Jay’s guilt

and 0f Wilder’s recanting discussed above, Wilder explained
jobs, living in her car,

and “ready

t0

at the trial that

she

was working ﬁve

g0 home” With Jay — a place she was prohibited from going

21

at the

time 0f the

trial.

(Trial Tn, V01.

I,

p.190, L.21

— p.191, L20; p.219, L.23 — p.221, L20.)

This provided additional motive for her recanting. Finally, as noted above, any improper portion

of the argument pertained only to the manner in Which

Any

it

was

presented, rather than

its

substance.

improper method of delivering the proper argument did not create prejudice in the

circumstances 0f this case.

Jay has failed t0 demonstrate fundamental error With respect to his prosecutorial

misconduct allegation. This Court should therefore

rej ect this

claim and afﬁrm Jay’s convictions.

IV.

Jay Has Failed T0 Show That The

A.

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

Jay contends that the
battery.

District

district court

imposed an excessive sentence

(Appellant’s brief, pp.26-29.) However, Jay cannot

he has failed to establish that the
for felony domestic battery,

district court’s

and decision

show he

is

for felony domestic

entitled to relief because

uniﬁed eight-year sentence With three years ﬁxed

to retain jurisdiction,

was excessive considering

the

objectives 0f sentencing, the nature 0f Jay’s offense, the danger Jay poses t0 the Victim and other

romantic partners, and other factors before the court.

B.

Standard

Of Review

When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review only for an abuse
0f discretion. State

V.

Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).

the burden of demonstrating that the sentencing court abused

22

its

discretion. Li.

The appellant has

The

C.

District

Court Acted Well Within

Its

Sentencing Discretion

T0 bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of
that,

under any reasonable View 0f the

sentence

is

rehabilitation,

to

accomplish

and retribution. Li;

App. 1982)

court abused

V.

sentence

is

excessive, Jay must demonstrate that reasonable

was appropriate

(Ct.

facts, the

discretion, the appellant

its

the

ﬂ

sentencing

goals

excessive.

Li.

T0

establish

establish that his

minds could not conclude the sentence
of protecting

society,

also State V. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568,

(setting forth these sentencing obj actives).

must

deterrence,

650 P.2d 707, 710

“When considering whether the district

sentencing discretion, [the appellate courts] review the entire sentence[.]”

m

Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citation omitted). However, the

appellate court will “presume that the defendant’s term of conﬁnement will probably be the

ﬁxed

portion of the sentence, because whether 0r not the defendant’s incarceration extends beyond the

ﬁxed portion of the sentence

Will be within the sole discretion of the parole board.”

Li

(citation

omitted).

In this case, prior t0 imposing

its

sentence, the district court reviewed the presentence

investigation report and domestic Violence assessment

it

had ordered, and expressly indicated

consideration of the applicable sentencing factors discussed above.

The

state

recommended

Ls.19-21.)

(9/3/19

Tr.,

a uniﬁed eight-year sentence with three years ﬁxed.

its

p.26, Ls.11-18.)

(9/3/19

Tr.,

p.18,

Jay recommended that the court impose a suspended sentence and place him 0n

probation. (9/3/19

Tr.,

p.25, Ls.15-22.)

The

district court

imposed a uniﬁed eight-year sentence

With three years ﬁxed, but retained jurisdiction for one year. (9/3/19

of the record supports the court’s sentencing determination.
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Tr.,

p.28, Ls.1-9.)

A review

The nature of Jay’s crime warranted
Which were documented
18), resulted

the sentence imposed.

Wilder’s numerous injuries,

in photos admitted into evidence at the jury trial (State’s Exhibits 1-1

from more than a

solitary act

1,

of Violence from Jay, and instead were caused by a

continuous attack. Wilder suffered a broken nose; multiple scratches on her neck; swelling on her

lower jaw, abrasions on the bridge of her nose; and bruising on her wrist, cheek, and above her
eyebrow. (Trial Tn, V01.

I,

p.309, L.8

— p.310, L.16;

Trial Tn, V01.

II,

p.8, Ls.3

— p.9, L25.) Jay

poses a particular continuing danger to Wilder (and any other romantic partners), in light of
Wilder’s Willingness t0 deny the occurrence of such Violence and attempts to conceal

it

from

authorities.

The

district court also

found

it

signiﬁcant that Jay did not accept responsibility for his

crime, and continued to “adhere t0 a false narrative as t0 What happened.” (9/3/19

—

p.27, L.4)

(ﬂ alﬂ PSI,3 pp.18,

investigator that

that Jay

it

p.26, L.24

35 (Jay’s statements t0 domestic Violence evaluator and PSI

was Wilder who attacked

was a “10w

Tr.,

him)).

The domestic Violence evaluator concluded

t0 moderate-risk” to re-offend (PSI, p.16),

and Jay’s aggregate LSI-R score

placed him in the “moderate” recidivism risk category (PSI, p.46). The PSI investigator concluded
that Jay

was a “marginal candidate

for an order of retained jurisdiction.” (PSI, p.48.)

This appears t0 have been Jay’s ﬁrst felony conviction.
Jay’s extensive history 0f

with no disposition

3

(ﬂ PSI, pp.35-38.)

However,

misdemeanor offenses (10 convictions, 2 other misdemeanor charges

listed),

demonstrate Jay’s inability to follow the law, and foreshadow his

Cited page numbers 0f the PSI refer to the page numbers of the electronic ﬁle containing the PSI,

domestic Violence evaluation, and other conﬁdential exhibits.
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community probation

difﬁculty in following the rules of a supervised

that opportunity immediately.

(Id.)

Further, While Jay has never

if

he had he been granted

been previously charged with

domestic Violence-related offenses, there are indications in the record (such prosecutor’s question
that

was

the subject 0f the mistrial motion, as discussed above), that his relationship with Wilder

involved physical abuse prior to this case. Despite denying the state’s version of events that was
supported by evidence submitted

at the trial,

Jay also told the presentence investigator that “this

has happened three times before, but this was the worst.” (PSI, p.35.)
Despite these concerns, the

district court

did not follow the state’s harsher sentencing

recommendation, and instead retained jurisdiction, giving Jay the opportunity for probation once
he completed a

rider.

thus acted well Within

This was an entirely appropriate sentence in this case.

it

The

sentencing discretion, and Jay has failed to demonstrate he

district court

is

entitled t0

relief.

CONCLUSION
The
upon the

state respectfully requests that this

trial

verdicts

Court afﬁrm the judgment of conviction entered

ﬁnding Jay guilty 0f felony domestic battery and misdemeanor obstructing

of an ofﬁcer.

DATED this 29th day of September, 2020.

/s/

Mark W. Olson

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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